44 . . Approved For Release 2003/08/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R005200670006-9 CONFIDENTIAL 25X1A CLASSIFICATION SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. 25X1 COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone) DATE DISTR. 11 July 1950 Capabilities of the Paramilitary Police SUBJECT NO. OF PAGES an to me the first PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. ACQUIRE 25X1A DATE OF 25X1 SUPPLEMENT TO INFO. REPORT NO. "不是一种的情况,我们就是一个人的人,我们就是一个人的人。" This document contains information affecting the rational depende of the united states within fus reaming of the expidings out so 0. F.C. 31 AND 22. AS REEDED. ITS TRANSPIRITION OF THE EXPLAIVON OF ITS CONTESTS IN ANY BASHIKE TO AN GRAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-BERTED BY LABY. EXPLOSECTION OF THIS YOUR IS FROMINTED. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 Paramilitary trainees in the schools and Bereitschaften are still not trained above platoon level, or in a few instances company level. Tactical employment of the paramilitary police in strength above platoon level would be out of the question because no organization of HVA effectives along tactical lines has been initiated, and because the officers lack practical experience in the exercise of command over larger numbers of men. Theoretical training of officers at Kochstedt and in the various Tbjekte has been confined to cand-table and map problems. It is believed that under combat conditions the HVA units would lack staying power, and that discipline would probably break down the moment the first shot was fired. Both non-coms and officers lack the requisite military background which should enable them to judge a tactical situation and draw the proper tactical conclusions. Consequently they would be unable to exercise tactical control over their troops under combat conditions. Assuming that the impending reorganization, under plans dispatched to the Objekte on 7 July 1950, is completed by 1 October 1950, and that from October on exclusive emphasis is placed on combat training, combat efficiency could not be attained before the end of April 1951. The continuing deterioration of morale is evidenced by the fact that in June the number of desertions reached an all-time high, approximately 80, which the HVA attributes to systematic subversion by "pawns of the United States" (the SPD Ostbireau). In a recent address before the SED Party group in the HVA, Heinrich Hoffmann, the chief of the HVA, asserted that the HVA is no longer dependent on the services of people who are not acting from full political conviction and who, in their working methods, refuse to abandon outdated reactices. In the meantime, he said, a sufficient number of politically conscious officers has been trained to take their places.* suppont No. CONFIDENTIA 25X1 GPA CLASSIFICATION X NAVY X NSRB DISTRIBUT STATE This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

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- 6. An unknown factor which would centribute to a decision by the HVA on the feasibility of an attack on West Berlin is the Communist estimate of American capabilities. An official in the Office of Information is quoted as saying that the opinion is widely held in East German government circles that American troops will not fight under any circumstances, since their position in Berlin is so patently horeless.
- 7. The new Hauptverwaltung Scepolizei moved on 7 July to premises vacated by the HVA on Kurze Strasse.

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		, most of whom are lukewarm in undergoing political schooling to join the CED. However, there is no reason to believ	
		will commence in the near future.	• •

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